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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - A MOVING 
TARGET 
Robert L. Knauss* 
Six years ago, Professor Alfred Conard did a shocking piece of 
research. He marshalled quantitative data and basic arithmetic to 
demonstrate that all corporations are not alike. In his article, The 
Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 1 Professor Conard de-
scribed the broad range of sizes of business corporations in the 
United States, and suggested that corporation law must be tailored 
to these differences. Unfortunately, Professor Conard's advice has 
been too often ignored. Most commentators still look to the largest, 
publicly traded corporations for their models of corporate govern-
ance; they still fail to acknowledge that problems and appropriate 
solutions may vary with corporate size. 
This Essay elaborates on Professor Conard's sensible suggestion 
with the hope that others will take it to heart. First, the Essay dis-
cusses the unique governance problems raised by what I call quasi-
publicly traded corporations. These smaller corporations, whose 
shares are not actively traded, have been largely neglected in most 
discussions of corporate governance. The neglect is ironic since most 
state corporation statutes were originally designed with the quasi-
publicly traded corporation in mind. Second, the Essay turns to a 
problem of corporate governance common to all corporations - the 
proper role of directors - and shows that appropriate standards 
may vary with the type of corporation at issue. It concludes that the 
director's role is best defined in terms of flexible common-law con-
cepts of :fiduciary duties. Together, the discussions of quasi-publicly 
traded corporations and :fiduciary duties of directors show that cor-
porate governance is not a static concept; it is rather a moving target, 
shifting with the regulatory problems of different sized corporations. 
• Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; 1980-1981, Visiting Professor of Law, Ver-
mont Law School, and Visiting Professor of Law and Management, Amos Tuck School of 
Business Administration, Dartmouth College. A.B. 1952, Harvard University; J.D. 1957, Uni-
versity of Michigan. - Ed. 
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478 
January 1981] Corporate Governance 479 
I. THE QUASI-PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION 
Much of the current interest in corporate governance stems from 
a rediscovery of old issues. Reformers complain that state general 
corporation laws offer little real protection to shareholders, that 
many corporations are large economic centers of power yet are be-
yond the reach of state regulatory authorities, and that shareholders 
have less and less of a role in management. None of these com-
plaints is new; all were first raised and debated nearly .fifty years 
ago.2 Current concern among the general public over the productiv-
ity,3 honesty,4 charity, social responsibility,5 and legitimacy6 of cor-
porations has raise4 these issues once again.7 The concern extends 
beyond publicly held corporations to corporate entities that are 
formed for nonprofit purposes8 and to large privately controlled enti-
2. For a description of the debate, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1933); W. RIP-
LEY, FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET (1932); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Berle, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: 
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). The most complete bibliography of sources on corpo-
rate government appears in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
557-74 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979). 
3. Productivity involves the promotion of investment capital, and improvement in effi-
ciency of the work force. The general public has a continuing interest in increased productiv-
ity, which includes encouragement of the migration of savings into investment, and rewarding 
of good business judgment. The promotion of investment capital is in the public interest, but it 
also reflects the shareholder's interest in obtaining a high return on his investment. The goal of 
maximizing profits thus is not the antithesis of public interest but is an important part of it. 
4. The public has an interest in seeing corporations act honestly. This interest goes beyond 
the shareholder's concern for honest disclosure of information and avoidance of self-dealing 
by management. 
5. The Business Roundtable recently identified four functions of the board of directors of 
the large publicly owned corporations: (1) management selection and succession, (2) approval 
of corporate decisions which have a major economic impact, (3) corporate social responsibility, 
and (4) compliance with the law. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATION 8-15 (1978), 
reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978). 
6. The legitimacy of corporate management is brought into issue because of the lack of 
shareholder control over management activities. But the concern goes beyond selection of 
managers. Managers making decisions affecting the larger community are apt to be as impor-
tant as elected city or state government officials. The public interest, then, is both in the pro-
cess of selection, and the accountability of those individuals who are selected. See Hessen, A 
New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 
1327 (1979); Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, in LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780-1970 (1970). 
7. One common element in approaching these issues is the fiduciary responsibility of direc-
tors discussed in section II of this Article. 
8. The nonprofit corporation should also be considered in the context of public interest in 
corporate governance. Although only a few nonprofit corporations are as large as the giant 
business corporations, they dominate some fields and some communities. 
For example, health care delivery is dependent on the private not-for-profit hospitals. Ap-
proximately 3,400 of the nation's 6,000 hospitals are nonprofit corporations, and these hospi-
tals account for 80% of total hospital revenues of $62 billion. At least a dozen of these private 
nonprofit hospitals have over $100 million in revenues. Hospitals are usually non-membership 
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ties that are centers of economic power.9 
Individual investors have much more specific concerns than 
those of the general public. Io They are primarily interested in ob-
taining accurate information so that they can continuously evaluate 
their investment and can act on that information by holding or sell-
ing the stock. An active market in the stock satisfies both of these 
needs for shareholders of publicly traded corporations. Federal se-
curities regulations and market forces inspire publicly traded corpo-
rations to share information with the investing public. This sharing 
creates a high quality securities market which operates honestly and 
efficiently: prices are not distorted by manipulation; short-term price 
swings are minimized; insider trading is controlled; and orders are 
handled fairly, at a low price. The trading market protects dissatis-
fied investors, who can readily sell their shares. It also creates a de-
gree of management accountability, since managers are keenly 
aware of the market price of the company's shares. I I 
Ideally, state corporation laws would offer investors in shares of 
corporations that are not actively traded an effective substitute for 
the market's information and liquidity by requiring disclosure of 
useful information and by mandating corporate behavior that substi-
tutes for investor liquidity. Unfortunately, current state laws fail to 
corporations, which means that the directors are selected by the existing board. See SENATE 
SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 96TH CONG., 1ST Sess., U.S. HOSPITALS 
REVENUE REPORTS 1976-1977 (Comm. Print 1979). 
9. By using several sources a rough composite comparison of private corporations can be 
made to the public business corporations in the Fortune 500. See note I 6 i'!fra. It is estimated 
that at least 50 privately held corporations, 60 foreign-owned corporations, and at least 15 
employee or farm cooperatives each had over $600 million in annual revenue. See CoRPO• 
RATE DATA EXCHANGE, INC., CDE STOCK OWNERSHIP DIRECTORY, AGRIBUSINESS (1978). 
These 125 entities would comprise about 25% of the Fortune 500 list if they were included. By 
a similar comparison about 32 private corporations, 33 foreign owned corporations and I 1 
cooperatives had over $900 million in revenues, and would comprise about 15% of the Forbes 
list of the largest publicly traded corporations of all types. 
None of these entities is affected by any of the SEC proposals concerning corporate govern-
ance, and none would be affected by any of the current legislative proposals involving federal 
incorporation. 
10. The typical investor has been described as: (1) leaving all decisions within the ordinary 
course of business to management; (2) desiring an opportunity to vote for management, and 
any significant change in management structure; (3) desiring an opportunity to vote for any 
fundamental changes in corporate structure, or decisions, made outside the ordinary course of 
business; (4) desiring an opportunity to remove the investment from the corporation if the 
investor dissents from any fundamental change in the business. To this list should be added an 
expectation of receiving information about his investment, and the right to protect his invest-
ment both by maintaining voting power and by preventing dilution of the investment. Thus, 
the investor expects to be able to make decisions about the evaluation of the investment, but 
not in the actual management of the investment. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION 9-17, 64-68 (1976). 
I 1. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Re-
considered, 77 CoLUM. L. _REv. 388, 402 (1977). 
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off er any meaningful regulation. Information is usually inadequate, 
and shareholder interests are frequently unprotected. Protecting the 
investor in the quasi-public corporation therefore poses a considera-
ble challenge to students of corporate governance. 
A. .Defining the Quasi-Publicly Traded Corporation 
Because of the overriding importance of liquidity to an investor, 
I will classify corporations according to the existence of active mar-
kets for their shares. The existence of a marketplace for shares 
changes the fundamental relationship of the shareholder to the cor-
poration. The ability to trade at any time provides the shareholder a 
flexibility comparable to the partner's right of dissolution. The de-
gree of liquidity determines the importance of structural formalities 
in a corporation and of accountability from officers and directors. 
The key category that I will examine is composed of what I have 
been calling the "quasi-publicly traded corporations." This category 
includes some 100,000 corporations with between eleven and 499 
shareholders each.12 The public shareholders of such companies are 
not involved in active management. The shares are freely transfera-
ble, and both management and investors expect that the corporation 
will continue to operate indefinitely. These corporations are not 
close corporations, nor are they incorporated partnerships. They are 
public corporations in every sense except that there is no active mar-
ket for the shares. The lack of an active market means that the sale 
price for shares may have little relation to their value, and that 
shareholders in these corporations, unlike investors in publicly 
traded corporations, do not have a liquid investment. 
The category of the quasi-publicly traded corporation is flanked 
by groups of larger and smaller corporations whose shareholders 
have varying regulatory needs because of differing levels of liquidity. 
At one end of the spectrum are some 1,900,000 small business corpo-
rations which each have between one and ten shareholders.13 In this 
12. This is an estimate. Professor Conard in his earlier study listed 71,000 companies with 
between 11 and 100 shareholders and 13,000 with between 101 and 1,000 shareholders -for a 
total of 84,000 with between 11 and 1,000. This was based on a total corporate population of 
1.6 million. See Conard, supra note l, at 458, table 6. Professor Eisenberg, also using a base 
of 1.6 million corporations, estimated that there are 70,000 corporations with between 11 and 
99 shareholders, and 26,500 with between 11 and 499 shareholders. M. EISENBERG, supra note 
10, at 42, table 5. 
13. These include one-person corporations, wholly owned subsidiaries, and a wide variety 
of business entities, most of which can be described as incorporated partnerships. A substan-
tial number of these corporate entities are involved in relatively little, if any, business activity, 
and many exist for only a short duration. Included in this category are the approximately 
360,000 companies which file Subchapter S income tax returns allowing the shareholders to be 
taxed as a partnership. 
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category, investors generally are involved in management, and there 
is no shareholder intent at the time of purchase ever to trade the 
shares. Liquidity is usually assured by some contractual arrange-
ment, or by a right to dissolution. 14 Thus the regulatory needs and 
desires of very small corporations and their shareholders are far dif-
ferent from those in the quasi-publicly traded corporation cate-
gory. is 
At the other end of the spectrum are the huge16 and not-so-huge 
corporations whose shareholders have access to an active market. 
Although some two million corporations filed corporate income tax 
returns in 1975,17 relatively few have issued shares that are actively 
traded in a secondary market. Estimates of the number of publicly 
traded companies vary, but a rough approximation would include 
14. Shareholders in these small corporations may find themselves locked into their invest-
ment in a manner similar to shareholders in the quasi-publicly traded corporation, but there 
are important differences. In corporations with less than ten shareholders all parties are fre-
quently involved in management, and have access to management information. Many of these 
corporations are intended to operate like partnerships, and shareholders may have dissolution 
rights similar to those of partners. The initial plan of incorporation and the shareholder agree• 
ment frequently contain buy-out provisions. The most significant distinction, however, is in 
the reasonable expectation of the shareholder. The shareholder ofan enterprise with less than 
ten investors knows he is locked into his investment unless some special provisions are taken. 
15. This is not to say that the regulation of small corporations could not, or should not, be 
improved. The corporations with ten shareholders should be given an option in their method 
of regulation. A close corporation statute with the flexibility to allow a company to operate 
like a partnership should be provided. The concept is that shares are not transferable, and the 
investment relationship is based on a contractual relationship. To the extent a company elects 
not to use close corporation provisions, statutory requirements for the quasi-publicly traded 
corporation should apply. 
16. "The Fortune 500" has achieved the status of a collective noun defining the giant cor-
porations. The list of the largest U.S. industrial corporations is ranked by revenues. In May 
1980 the largest corporation, Exxon, had $79 billion in revenues, and the 500th corporation 
had $409 million. See The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FOR• 
TUNE, May 5, 1980, at 274-301. The Fortune Second 500 ranged from $409 million in revenues 
to $117 million. See FORTUNE, June 16, 1980, at 176-95. 
A more recent entry in the ranking game is the Forbes-Dimensions of American Business. 
See FORBES, May 12, 1980, at 214-18. Forbes ranks the 500 largest publicly traded corpora-
tions, including utilities and financial institutions, in four separate categories: revenues, assets, 
net profits, and market value. Two-hundred-fifty-four corporations are in the top 500 in all 
four categories, and a total of 801 corporations are listed in one of the four categories. The 
ranges for sales and assets are as follows: 
Rank Revenues 
-1- $79 billion 




Seventy-eight companies had revenues of over $5 billion and 265 had revenues of over $2 
billion. The largest 15 corporations had combined revenues of over $500 billion, which is 
larger than the total revenues of the federal government. The over two million corporations 
had combined revenues of about $3.606 trillion. Twenty-three percent of the corporations had 
revenues less than $25,000, forty-four percent less than $100,000, and eighty-eight percent less 
than $1 million. 
17. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPT. OF TREASURY, No. 16 (2-80), STATISTICS OF IN-
COME ... 1975, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 106, table II (1979). 
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about 6,500 companies that have equity securities held by more than 
500 shareholders and that are subject to the reporting, proxy, and 
insider trading requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.18 
Some commentators have mistakenly criticized the "race to the 
bottom" in state corporation laws for creating problems of gover-
nance in publicly traded corporations. Such an analysis misses the 
mark. The statutory changes which have taken place in Delaware, 
New Jersey, and other "liberal" jurisdictions have not been particu-
larly detrimental to the minority shareholder of the publicly traded 
corporation. Regulation of publicly traded corporations remains ap-
propriately (and successfully) focused at the federal level. 19 The real 
problem with state general corporation laws lies in their failure to 
distinguish between corporations whose shares are actively traded 
and corporations whose shares are not. 
B. Regulating the Quasi-Publicly Traded Corporation 
It is appropriate for states to regulate quasi-publicly traded cor-
porations because the needed type of regulation has traq.itionally 
been found in state corporation laws. State laws can have a signifi-
cant impact because of both the relatively small size of these corpo-
rations and their tendency, unlike the larger publicly traded 
18. Some 9,800 issuers are required to file annual reports with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMN., DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES RE-
QUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at 1 
(1980). The Directory includes all issuers listed on a national securities exchange, and all 
others required to file under§§ 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934. This list includes 
a significant number of stock purchase plans and other entities which duplicate the separate 
corporate listing. The Securities and Exchange Commission reports that about 6,500 separate 
corporations submitted proxy statements, or proxy informational statements, for review. This 
may be a more meaningful figure representing separate corporate entities with equity securi-
ties. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMN., ANNUAL REPORT 111 app. (1977). This was the 
last annual report which contained statistical information on issuers. This report also cited 
6,798 securities listed on a registered stock exchange representing 3,283 separate issuers, and 
cited 2,627 issuers which were regularly quoted in the NASDAQ System. Id. at 311, 315. 
19. The approximately 6,500 publicly traded corporations are subject to the regulatory 
provisions of the 1934 Exchange Act. All must file periodic reports, send information to share-
holders at least once a year under the proxy provisions, and subject officers and directors to the 
insider trading provisions. 
Historically the SEC has given priority to regulation of the initial distribution of securities 
under the 1933 Act. The primary purpose of the regulatory activity has been to protect inves-
tors from fraud, and is aimed at wrongdoing by issuers, licensed broker-dealers, accountants, 
lawyers, and other participants in the market place. During the past several years there has 
been a shift of emphasis to regulation of continuous disclosure and concern with the quality of 
the marketplace. In terms both of shareholder protection and the public interest this shift is 
proper and should be accelerated. Today, the highest priority of the SEC should be to pro-
mote the operation of the secondary trading markets. 
The primary function for state regulation of the publicly traded corporation is to provide a 
forum for enforcing strong and consistent fiduciary duties on officers and directors. 
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corporations, to incorporate in the state where their principal place 
of business is located.20 The need for greater state governance of 
quasi-publicly traded corporations is increased by the lack of federal 
controls. Companies in the quasi-public category are not registered 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and thus are not covered 
by federal disclosure, proxy, takeover bid, and insider trading regu-
lations. If one views these provisions as designed to protect the trad-
ing markets, it is sensible that they would not apply to quasi-publicly 
traded corporations. Nevertheless, in many respects, it is the share-
holders in these companies that have the greatest need for the direct 
regulatory protection offered by the 1934 Act. State law must pick 
up where the federal regulation stops. 
State legislatures transformed their corporate regulations into en-
abling statutes to attract large corporations. And, indeed, aside from 
identifying fiduciary duties it is appropriate that state law be 
uninvolved in direct regulation of publicly traded corporations. But 
it is time to return to a regulatory orientation for the quasi-publicly 
traded corporation. States should begin with four reforms from 
which publicly traded corporations could be exempted: shareholder 
voting controls; preemptive stock purchasing rights; appraisal rights; 
and mandatory disclosure of information to shareholders. 
First, state corporation statutes should require procedures that 
insure shareholder voting control. Shareholder voting rights are de-
sirable not because they assure accountability (their primary virtue 
in the context of large publicly traded companies), but because they 
promote actual shareholder control. Shareholders in the quasi-pub-
licly traded corporation cannot exercise their option under the "Wall 
Street ·Rule,"21 so they must be able to influence or change manage-
ment and its policies in some other way when they are dissatisfied 
with the operation of their company. For companies with fewer than 
500 shareholders, the shareholder meeting is usually the forum for 
actual voting. The proxy system can be critical, and state law should 
give a high priority to proxy regulation in order to insure fair and 
proper voting procedures. There is little need to require prior review 
of corporate proxy materials, but there should be rules punishing 
20. See CAL. CoRP. CooE § 2115 (West 1979). Under the provisions of the California 
Corporation Code, a state could invoke its jurisdiction over "foreign" corporations that have a 
significant nexus within the state. 
21. For the past generation, the conventional wisdom has been that investors in publicly 
traded companies follow the "Wall Street Rule": if shareholders are dissatisfied with the com-
pany, their recourse is to sell their shares. Like much conventional wisdom, this is generally 
accurate. It is inaccurate in part because of the failure to recognize the number of publicly 
traded corporations in which stock is concentrated in large blocks, and because of employee 
stockholders who may be locked into their investment. 
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misleading statements or omissions, and investors should have easy 
access to shareholder lists. The various structural prohibitions which 
were a part of many state corporation acts should also be reconsid-
ered. Our goal is to provide shareholders an opportunity to control 
management through the directors, so only shares with voting rights 
should be sold. Staggered terms for directors should be prevented, 
and other devices that restrict shareholder control should be prohib-
ited. Cumulative voting should be allowed, because it assures some 
representation for minority shareholders who may be locked into 
their investment. 
Second, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations 
should have a preemptive right to purchase a pro rata share of the 
securities in any new stock issuance. Mandatory preemptive rights 
have disappeared from almost all state corporation acts because they 
offer stockholders of publicly traded companies unnecessary protec-
tion. But for quasi-publicly traded corporations, a well-drafted pre-
emptive rights statute makes sense. Preemptive rights preserve both 
the investor's voting power and the value of his stock. Voting power 
is preserved because a shareholder who owns a percentage of shares 
would be able to retain the same percentage following any future 
issuance of stock by the company. Where no public market for the 
shares exists, a shareholder denied preemptive rights is unable to 
maintain his relative position of control. Preemptive rights also pre-
vent dilution of share value. The lack of a trading market to estab-
lish value makes the setting of a price on a new distribution of stock 
a matter of guesswork, and even the good faith of the directors will 
not prevent dilution if there is no way to determine market value. 
Because preemptive rights permit the shareholder to retain owner-
ship of the same percentage of outstanding shares before and after 
each new issuance, they prevent dilution of the value of the invest-
ment. Thus, while preemptive rights are of little or no value to a 
shareholder in a publicly traded corporation, they are essential to 
shareholders in a company whose shares are not actively traded. 
Third, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations should 
have limited appraisal rights. When the investor does not approve of 
fundamental change in the nature of the corporation, he should be 
able to obtain the cash value of his investment from the corporation. 
The appraisal right should be limited because the investor who 
purchases shares in a quasi-public corporation should know that his 
investment is not liquid and should not expect to be able to resell his 
shares to the corporation unless a specific contractual agreement pro-
vides for repurchase. Nevertheless, an investor in even a quasi-pub-
486 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 79:478 
lie corporation has the reasonable expectation that it will continue in 
the same line of business and that it will operate under the same 
general structure. If a majority of the shareholders in a quasi-public 
corporation decides to make fundamental changes in the corporation 
- amendments to the articles of incorporation, sale of substantially 
all of the assets, or restructuring through merger or combination - a 
dissenter should have appraisal rights to protect his reasonable ex-
pectation. 
Shareholders in publicly traded corporations have little reason to 
object to the recent changes in many corporation statutes which per-
mit fundamental changes and amendments with a simple majority 
vote. The dissenting shareholder in a publicly traded company has 
little need for appraisal rights since he can sell his shares on the mar-
ket. 22 Similarly, dissatisfied shareholders in an incorporated part-
nership often have a contractual right to force a dissolution. But a 
dissenting shareholder in a quasi-publicly traded corporation has ac-
cess to no trading market, and dissolution is not a fair or appropriate 
solution. In this situation statutory provisions providing for ap-
praisal rights of dissenting shareholders are a reasonable answer. 
Appraisal rights provide the dissenting shareholders an option to 
maintain their investment in the new or altered enterprise or to re-
ceive the cash value of their investment. The use of the appraisal 
mechanism by the majority to squeeze out minority holders raises 
different questions involving the fiduciary responsibilities of the ma-
jority to the minority. The appraisal remedy should be viewed as a 
compromise that allows a substantial majority of existing sharehold-
ers to change the basic nature of the company if they want to, while 
at the same time assuring liquidity to the dissenters. The appraisal 
remedy should be rigorous enough to keep management from doing 
indirectly what it would be prohibited from doing directly. And be-
cause the appraisal remedy is analogous to a statutory buy-out 
agreement, it is appropriate to provide a period of time for payment 
in order not to force actual liquidation or dissolution of the com-
pany. . 
Finally, shareholders in quasi-publicly traded corporations 
should have a right to information about their investment. Corpora-
tions with fewer than 500 shareholders are not bound by federal re-
porting requirements, and in most states no laws adequately regulate 
financial disclosure to shareholders. Some economists have argued 
22. For competing arguments about appraisal rights even in publicly traded companies, 
see M. EISENBERG, supra note I 0, at 69-84, and Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: 
An Essay far Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962). 
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that because there is a market for information about publicly traded 
companies, the regulatory provisions of the federal securities laws 
play a rather modest role in disclosure of information by those com-
panies. The marketplace itself forces disclosure when such compa-
nies attempt to sell securities to the public and when shares are 
actively traded in the secondary market. Without a marketplace 
there is no economic pressure for disclosure. After the time of initial 
investment, investors in a quasi-publicly traded company have little 
bargaining power to force the company to make periodic financial 
disclosures. For the publicly traded corporation, disclosure is 
needed if the marketplace is to evaluate the shares accurately. ;For 
the quasi-publicly traded company, disclosure is needed if the share-
holders are to judge the progress of the company, evaluate manage-
ment, and exercise their voting rights. 
At a minimum, state regulations should entitle shareholders of 
quasi-publicly traded corporations to an annual report including 
financial statements, and should protect shareholders from false or 
misleading statements in a company's periodic reports, proxy litera-
ture, or other communications. This protection need not entail great 
expense; a rule similar to rule 242 of the 1933 Securities Act might be 
adopted. This rule would merely require that a corporation provide 
equivalent information to all investors - thereby assuring that all 
investors will share information that any one investor receives. 
Together, these four reforms go a long way toward providing in-
vestors in quasi-publicly traded corporations the protection they 
need. State general corporation acts should be amended to apply 
these provisions, not to all corporations, but only to those corpora-
tions where the need is identified. 
II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS 
Although it has attracted far more attention than has the quasi-
publicly traded corporation, the search for the appropriate role for 
the corporate director remains the central problem of corporate gov-
ernance. Traditional analysis focuses on the director's obligations of 
due care and loyalty, but understates the key feature of these obliga-
tions - that they are owed to the corporation. In this section I em-
phasize that the director should be viewed as a fiduciary to the 
corporate entity. The fiduciary concept clearly identifies the direc-
tor's obligations to the corporation and permits flexibility in the di-
rector's role according to the nature of the enterprise. 
The fiduciary duties of directors arise because property has been 
placed in their care. Directors have a responsibility to use that prop-
488 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:478 
erty according to the terms of the corporate charter, the law, and the 
general requirements of good citizenship imposed on any owner of 
the property. Fiduciaries owe duties to a principal. Directors of 
large publicly traded corporations, small corporations, and nonprofit 
corporations all owe fiduciary duties to their corporation, and not to 
any particular corporate constituency.23 Their specific responsibili-
ties in complying with these duties will differ depending on the pur-
pose and power of the corporations they serve. Directors of ~11 
-corporations have a responsibility to use funds properly, not to waste 
corporate assets, to insure honest and efficient management, and to 
carry out the purposes of the corporate charter. The director or 
trustee of a private university makes decisions based on what is best 
for the university - the entity - and not for individual students or 
faculty. In the same way, a director of a business corporation makes 
decisions based on what is best for the entity, and not for the em-
ployees or even the individual shareholders. By comparing the re-
sponsibilities of the directors of publicly traded business 
corporations and nonprofit corporations, I do not mean to underesti-
mate the importance of the profit-making purpose of business corpo-
rations, but rather to stress that the entity and the corporate purpose 
is the focus of a director's duties. Professor Dodd advocated a simi-
lar concept when he urged that directors should think of themselves 
not as attorneys for the investors, but as trustees for the enterprise.24 
Some commentators have recently criticized the use of the term 
"fiduciary" in defining directors' duties. The American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Corporations deliberately avoided the term in its 
redraft of section 35 on the Duty of Care in the Model Business Cor-
poration Act.25 This avoidance is a mistake. While Justice Frank-
23. A breach of fiduciary duty can be challenged only by a director's or shareholder's suit 
on behalf of the corporate entity. This emphasis is particularly important in the context of 
corporate governance and the claims made by various corporate constituencies. 
24. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1160 
(1932). There should be no presumption that consideration of the public interest will lead to a 
splintering of director responsibility. There is also no case law that indicates potential liability 
of directors for this approach. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 1970 N.W. 668 
(1919), the court did admonish Henry Ford not to run the company for his own interests to the 
detriment of shareholders, but it supported the expenditures for long-range corporate develop-
ment. Bui see Conard, Reflections on Public Interest .Directors, 15 MICH. L. REV. 941, 947 
(1977). 
25. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 35 (Comments on Amendments), reprinted in 33 Bus. 
LAW. 1631, 1634 (1978): 
The committee took the view that those responsibilities of directors which are fiduciary in 
nature would be sufficiently comprehended in the affirmative standard proposed so as to 
make unnecessary the use of a term which represents the possibility of importing into the 
area of corporation law more than is appropriate of the attributes and obligations of a 
fiduciary as firmly established in the law of trusts. 
On the other hand, Professor Coffee criticizes the use of the term because it is too narrow and 
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furter was correct in stating that the designation of a party as a 
"fiduciary" merely initiates the inquiry as to the specific obliga-
tions,26 this does not mean that the designation is without value. The 
duties of directors of corporations have evolved through the com- · 
mon law, and have been built on the foundation of agency. In the 
early 1800s judges and lawyers were well aware that directors were 
fiduciaries.27 The Restatement Second of Agency states that an agent 
is a fiduciary28 and that members of boards of directors resemble 
agents in that they act on behalf of others and are fiduciaries owing 
duties of loyalty and care.29 Although the contemporary corporate 
directorship involves complex relationships,30 the decision-making 
process su:ff ers if corporate lawyers attempt to invest the term "direc-
tor" with a new set of duties unrelated to fiduciary concepts. This 
denies a rich and valuable heritage. 
The .fiduciary concept is of particular value today to counteract 
the influence of federal securities regulation on corporate law. For 
the past twenty years plaintiffs' attorneys have attempted to squeeze 
all varieties of director misconduct into the mold of breach of a duty 
to disclose and, therefore, breach of the federal securities laws. This 
emphasis has diminished directors' sensitivity to other aspects of 
their duties. The prohibitions of conflicts of interest and breach of 
due care and the requirements of fairness have taken second place. 
The recent unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to 
sanction a federal corporation law under the securities acts31 has re-
stored prominence to state remedies and created a need to rediscover 
traditional duties. 
Under ~ost state corporations statutes, directors have the.respon-
sibility to manage or direct the management of the corporation. To 
carry out this responsibility directors must discharge duties of care 
and of loyalty. When a corporation undertakes specific obligations, 
directors as fiduciaries to the corporation are required to use due 
care to insure that these obligations are performed. The director's 
leads to "tunnel vision." See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View 
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977). 
26. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943). 
27. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 70-71 (1954). 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). 
29. "Members of boards resemble agents in that they act on behalf of others and are 
fiduciaries owing duties of loyalty and care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14c, 
comment (1958). 
30. For a thoughtful description of relationships, see Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the 
Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976). 
31. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975). 
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duty ofloyalty requires him to avoid conflicts of interest or to resolve 
them in the best interest of his corporation. Each of these traditional 
directors' duties - of care and of loyalty - is clarified by viewing 
the director as a fiduciary. This section describes these duties, and 
then turns to several remaining implications of applying the fiduci-
ary concept to the corporate director. 
A. The .Director's .Duty of Care 
A contemporary approach to the director's duty of care can best 
be gleaned by reading the Model Business Corporation Act together 
with the business judgment rule, the Corporate .Director's Guide-
book, 32 and several court decisions. Section 35 of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act sets forth the basic corporate rule: 
A director shall perform his duties as a director including his duties as 
a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in 
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinary person in a 
like position would use under similar circumstances. 
This section is a slightly wordier form of the standard of care in most 
jurisdictions in the United States, and closely resembles a typical 
fiduciary standard of care.33 Even Delaware courts are reported to 
follow this standard, though the legislature has not adopted the 
MBCA language. 34 
A short version of the business judgment rule is simply that a 
corporate transaction not involving a conflict of interest will not be 
subject to judicial inquiry if made in good faith.35 Courts distinguish 
between inquiry into the procedure by which the directors reached 
32. Corporate .Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1978). 
33. Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to a principal to act with 
standard care and skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work for which he 
is employed to perform, and in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 379 (1958). Compare the standard of care for an agent 
with that of a trustee in I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174 (1959): 
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such 
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that 
he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise 
such skill. 
The words are slightly rotated, but the thought remains the same in the standard of care de-
scribed under ERISA: 
. . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in 
the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims. 
34. For an excellent discussion of§ 35 of the MBCA in respect to Delaware law, see Arsht 
& Hinsey, Cod!fted Standard- Same Harbor but Charted Channel· A Response, 35 Bus. LAW, 
947 (1980). 
35. For a longer version, see 35 Bus. LAW. at 956. 
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their decision, and an inquiry into the correctness of the decision. 36 
The good faith requirement places a burden on directors to show 
how they reached the decision and what factors they considered. To 
demonstrate good faith the directors need show only that the deci-
sion was made on a reasonable basis under the circumstances. 
The Corporate .Director's Guidebook describes the duties and re-
sponsibilities of a director of a publicly traded corporation. The 
Guidebook also presents a recommended organizational model for 
the publicly traded company: a board with a majority of unaffiliated 
directors and a committee structure with nominating, compensation, 
and audit committees composed of unaffiliated directors. The Guide-
book's recommended standards could quickly grow into legal re-
quirements.37 For example, a director of a publicly traded company 
might not be acting in good faith if a majority of his board members 
are "insiders." Similarly, if the board is organized without a series 
of committees, has no staffing assistance, and has no access to needed 
information, the director may not be acting in good faith. 
Section 35 of the MBCA als~ontains a provision allowing a di-
rector to rely upon documents and statements made by others 
"whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and compe-
tent." A recent supplement to the Corporate .Director's Guidebook 
describes the role and function of the Audit Committee, and suggests 
an agenda, timetable, and procedures for an audit committee of a 
publicly traded company.38 If one adds the suggestions in this guide 
to section 35, one acceptable pattern of an internal control system 
emerges. If followed, it should allow directors to rely on documents 
and statements prepared by the company officers. It is a description 
of due care which would permit the presumption that a director acts 
reasonably when he believes that an officer or employee is reliable 
and competent. 
The courts have infrequently considered the director's proper 
duty of care to the corporate entity, but an analogy can be drawn 
from two securities cases. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corpora-
tion39 contains the most complete discussion of director liability 
36. A specific articulation of this approach to due care and the business judgment rule was 
made by the New York Court of Appeals in upholding a decision by directors to dismiss a 
shareholder's derivative suit Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S. 
920 (N.Y. 1979). 
37. The Corporate Pirector's Guidebook applies only to publicly traded corporations. It is 
to be expected that different responsibilities and organizational patterns would apply to direc-
tors of other corporate entities. 
38. ABA COMMITIEE ON CORP. LAWS, THE OVERVIEW COMMITIEE OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, reprinted in 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1351 (1980). 
39. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The court held vari-
ous directors liable to purchasers of securities during a public offer-
ing because, of material misstatements in the prospectus. The 
directors failed to prove the affirmative defense available to a direc-
tor who shows that "he had after reasonable investigation, reason-
able ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the 
registration statement became effective, that the statements therein 
were true."40 In a related case, Lanza v . .Drexel & Co. ,41 the plaintiffs 
alleged director responsibility for misstatements of corporate officers 
during a private merger transaction in violation of rule IOb-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a common-law standard of care. 
The court found no liability. An analysis of these two cases in terms 
of strict liability, scienter, recklessness or negligence is not helpful. 
The focus should be on whether the director used such care as an 
ordinary prudent person would use in a public securities offering 
(Barchris) or in a private offering (Lanza). It is necessary in these 
circumstances to think not only of individual due care but also of the 
directors' collective duty. Did the directors organize the board struc-
ture to appropriately monitor a securities offering? Did they direct 
management on appropriate standards for release of information in 
connection with a stock offering? Did they develop appropriate in-
ternal auditing standards, and a check by an audit committee of the 
needed disclosure documents? Were these internal standards suffi-
cient to allow the directors to rely on documents prepared by man-
agement? 
The degree of care expected from a director of a publicly traded 
corporation has increased dramatically in the past decade. It would 
not be surprising for this growth to continue through the 1980s. 
What is considered prudent behavior for a director of a corporation 
should depend upon a thoughtful consideration of practical business 
considerations, as well as of questions of liability. The American 
Law Institute project on corporate governance should examine this 
approach through a Restatement of Fiduciary Duties of Directors.42 
B. The .Director's .Duty of Loyalty 
No single statutory provision covers the subject of loyalty as 
comprehensively as section 35 of the MBCA covers due care. While 
almost all state corporation laws have provisions similar to section 
40. Securities Act of 1933 § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). 
41. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). 
42. The American Law Institute has announced a project on Corporate Goverance under 
the direction of Stanley Kaplan. 
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41 of the MBCA, which specifies procedures when a corporation en-
ters into a contract in which a director has a private interest, these 
procedures address only one of a large number of loyalty duties. 
Section 41 of the MBCA has limited application even with respect to 
contracts between a director and a corporation. It prevents contracts 
from being void or voidable because a director is on one side of the 
agreement, if after disclosure there has been approval by a majority 
of the board of disinterested directors, or a vote of the shareholders, 
or if the contract is fair. Section 41 is silent on the potential for chal-
lenging a contract because of other conflicts of interest, or because of 
unfairness. In most state corporation acts, no statutory provisions 
cover corporate opportunity, use of confidential information, rela-
tionships between parent and subsidiary corporations, and the multi-
tude of other conflict-of-interest situations which arise in a corporate 
setting. Traditional agency analysis is a helpful place to begin exam-
ining corporate conflict of interest. A brief description of the issues 
involved in four settings - corporate opportunity, insider trading, 
multiple directorships, and parent-subsidiary problems - demon-
strates the value of identifying directors as fiduciaries to the corpo-
rate enterprise. 
A classic corporate opportunity conflict-of-interest case arises 
when an officer-director hears about an investment opportunity be-
cause of his position, uses company resources to develop a product in 
the line of business of the corporation, does not give the company a 
chance to reject the opportunity, and then takes the product for his 
own private use.43 One way to analyze this problem is to compare it 
to the the way courts treat the conflict-of-interest dilemma in an in-
dividual agency situation. When there is a conflict between the 
agent's personal interest and the interest of the principal, the agent's 
duty is clear. The real estate agent who purchases land for himself 
when traveling on an employer's expense account must hold the land 
in constructive trust for his employer.44 In addition to any remedy 
for breach of contract or damages in tort, the agent can be forced to 
disgorge any profits he made from the use of information or re-
sources gained from his position even if the principal cannot prove 
any actual damages. Only full disclosure to the principal followed by 
his consent will allow an agent to profit from information or re-
sources received from his agency position. 
In the corporate setting, one difficulty is determining whether the 
43. See Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). 
44. See, e.g., Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 423, 289 N.W. 509 (1939). 
494 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:478 
agent has permission to use the opportunity. How is full disclosure 
made to the enterprise, and how does the enterprise give consent? It 
is usually assumed that since directors are responsible for the man-
agement of the corporation ( or directing the management), disclo-
sure to directors and receipt of their consent is sufficient to avoid 
liability. By analogy, provisions such as section 41 of the MBCA 
permit directors to obtain consent to their personal involvement in a 
contract with the corporation by disclosure and the vote of disinter-
ested directors. In some situations, however, this is not an appropri-
ate procedure because directors are incapable of giving consent. 
This problem can arise when a majority of the directors are involved 
in the transaction, or when the nature of the information or re-
sources used has a direct effect on individual shareholders. An ex-
ample of this latter situation is the use of inside information by 
officers and directors to trade in shares of the company. 
Most insider trading cases have been based on allegations of 
fraud between individual purchasers and sellers, and have been 
brought under rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45 
An alternative approach that seems particularly appropriate to in-
sider trading of the shares of publicly traded companies is to base the 
liability on the fiduciary duty of directors and employees not to use 
information gained on the job for personal profit. Unless there has 
been full disclosure to and consent by the corporation, any director 
or agent has a duty to disgorge any profits made from use of insider 
information. The duty does not rest on any showing of damage or 
loss. This approach was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals 
in .Diamond v. Oreamuno,46 but it has been rejected in Florida. The 
Florida Supreme Court has taken the position that directors do not 
owe any duties to individual shareholders, and that the insider trad-
ing must damage the corporation before the corporation can re-
cover.47 The Florida court missed the basic fiduciary remedy which 
would require disgorgement of profits regardless of any showing of 
damage. 
Multiple directorships present a particularly difficult dilemma for 
the agency approach to corporate conflicts of interest.48 The normal 
45. Compare Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) with SEC 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), 
46. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910,401 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). 
47. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975). This case involved a corporate officer as 
tippee, and direct profits were not shown. The court disavowed Diamond v. Oreamuno, how-
ever, stating that a derivative suit could not be brought unless there was a showing of damage 
to the corporation. 
48. See, e.g., Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 191 A.2d 919 (1956). 
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expectation in an agency relationship is that the agent will not serve 
competing clients. The exceptions - for example, the real estate 
broker who represents several s_ellers of property - are based on an 
assumption that the agent has made full disclosure of his conflict, 
and that the sellers have consented to their agent operating for com-
peting parties. 49 If he acted without disclosure and consent, the real 
estate agent would violate his fiduciary duties. The parties also as-
sume that the agent will treat each seller fairly, without any breach 
of confidential information. By analogy, the starting point for ana-
lyzing multiple directorships should be a prohibition against serving 
on boards of competing companies. The key to exceptions should be 
the expectation of shareholders of the competing corporate entities, 
the extent of the disclosure needed, and the nature of the consent. 
The relationship of a parent corporation to minority shareholders 
of a subsidiary presents a fourth set of particularly difficult conflict-
of-interest problems. The conflicts may be so fundamental that dis-
closure cannot cure them, and even if disclosure is capable of provid-
ing a remedy there remains the question of insuring effective 
shareholder consent. State corporation statutes similar to section 41 
of the MBCA are not helpful. In the contract between a parent cor-
poration and its subsidiary, the whole board of each corporation is 
an interested party. In effect the parent is negotiating on both sides 
of the agreement. In this situation it is also unrealistic to think in 
terms of any meaningful consent by shareholders of the subsidiary, 
because the parent corporation usually controls the overwhelming 
majority of the shares. 
In Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, so the Delaware Supreme 
Court recognized the fiduciary duty of a parent corporation to a sub-
sidiary, but held that the duties applied only to transactions involv-
ing self-dealing, which it defined as transactions in which the parent 
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion and detri-
ment of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. If a transaction 
involves self-dealing, the court held, the test of intrinsic fairness 
shifts the burden of proof to the parent. In all other situations the 
usual business judgment rule was held to apply. The court failed to 
recognize that parent and subsidiary transactions always involve 
49. See Foley v. Mathias, 211 Iowa 160, 233 N.W. 106 (1930). 
50. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). Sinclair Oil involved a dispute between the minority share-
holders of a subsidiary (Sinven), and the parent company (Sinclair). The complaint alleged 
the misdirection of corporate opportunity, payment of excessive dividends, and unfairness in 
contract negotiation. Sinclair owned 97% of the stock of Sinven, and nominated and elected 
all members of the board of Sinven, all of whom were officers and directors of Sinclair. 
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conflicts of interest, and are incapable of resolution by disclosure 
and consent of disinterested members of the board. A traditional 
agency approach would shift the burden of proof to the parent's di-
rectors in all transactions between a parent corporation and a subsid-
iary with minority shareholders. This rule is an appropriate starting 
place, but without more it could encourage corporations to squeeze 
out the minority shareholders of their subsidiaries. This would be 
unfortunate, because squeeze-outs can frequently work a hardship 
on shareholders. To protect shareholders from such hardships courts 
should consider the expectations of shareholders investing in subsid-
iaries, and the existence or lack of a trading market. Where a sub-
sidiary must have minority shareholders (as is the case for many 
foreign subsidiaries) there should be guidelines for arms-length 
transactions and a standard for judging fairness. 
The relationship of "due care," the "business judgment rule," 
and conflict of interest becomes extremely complex. The American 
Law Institute project on corporate governance can also perform a 
valuable service in this area. In particular, it can develop procedures 
for providing disclosure and obtaining consent that vary according 
to whether the corporation is publicly traded, privately held, or non-
profit. I believe the best starting place for resolving these issues is 
the specific application of traditional fiduciary duties. 
C. The .Director as a Fiduciary 
The emphasis on the fiduciary responsibility of directors to the 
entity also helps us address two other problems of corporate gover-
nance. First, the fiduciary concept helps to define the factors direc-
tors should consider in making decisions for the corporation. 
Second, the concept suggests a proper composition for the board. 
The first problem - what factors a director should consider in 
decision-making - frequently arises when someone complains 
about the social irresponsibility of a corporation's decision (whether 
it be to lay off workers, to manufacture a controversial product, or its 
failure to make substantial charitable contributions). Corporate so-
cial responsibility is usually discussed in terms of a conflict in direc-
tors' duties. Are directors under a duty only to maximize profits for 
shareholders, or is it appropriate to consider the interests of employ-
ees, consumers, neighbors of corporate facilities, and members of the 
general public? The Business Roundtable identifies oversight of cor-
porate social responsibility as one of the four main duties of direc-
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tors.51 At the same time, it charges directors to "direct the enterprise 
in the interest of the owners, subject to constraints imposed by law." 
This apparent conflict is resolved by stressing the goal of long-term 
profitability rather than short-term profit maximization. The 
Roundtable opens the door to consideration of social responsibility 
by stating that long-term profitability is tied to the social viability of 
the corporation. By appealing to long-term profitability and the 
needs of future investors, directors are in less danger of criticism. 
Yet this solution is ultimately unsatisfying. 
The question of what a director is entitled to consider in making 
a judgment affecting the corporation is brought sharply into focus in 
the takeover bid situation. When a bid at a substantial premium 
over current market price is made, directors must decide whether to 
endorse or fight the offer. 52 It is natural for personal considerations 
to play a role in these decisions, and it can be argued that allowing 
directors to consider any interest other than immediate shareholder 
pro.fit only provides a cover for decisions based on personal interests. 
Conflict-of-interest questions aside, however, is it in the public inter-
est to allow directors to consider the impact of a takeover on employ-
ees, local communities, and the long-range development of the 
company? Do boards have to do what is best for the arbitragers and 
professional investors who hope to turn a quick pro.fit? Do boards 
need to evaluate their corporations constantly to see if liquidation 
most benefits shareholders? Arguing long-term versus short-term 
pro.fits is one way for directors to rationalize rejection of an immedi-
ate premium for existing shareholders. It provides an acceptable ba-
sis for boards to maintain the independence of the corporation. No 
one can object to a company's purchase of mineral reserves to be 
used twenty years later, development of a personnel plan to produce 
future executives, or investment in research and development which 
may have only a long-term returi:L. Long-term profitability is a con-
cept that makes sense, and allows directors import~t latitµde .in ex-
ercising their duty of care. But one should not be foole~ by it. , The 
concept legitimates consideration of the needs of future investors, 
and this implies that the corporate entity has a life of its own. A 
51. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5. 
52. A distinction should be made between a partial tender offer and a 100% takeover. In 
the partial takeover control will shift, but minority shareholders of the target remain. In this 
situation it is necessary for directors of the target company to investigate the honesty and 
competency of the bidding company. Long-range business plans are also important. It can be 
argued that in the 100% takeover situation the target management need look only to the ques-
tion of adequacy of price. 
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more straightforward and accurate description of a director's duty is 
to identify the object of the duty as the enterprise itself. 
Identifying the director's duty to the entity allows consideration 
of all factors which have a bearing on long-term benefit. Dissolution 
and liquidation may be appropriate if a corporation can no longer 
achieve its purpose, but directors do not constantly need to evaluate 
and base decisions on short-term return for investors. Duty to the 
entity also helps identify directors' general duties of social responsi-
bility and corporate accountability. Our expectation that individuals 
will act in a socially responsible manner is not removed by the pro-
cess of incorporation. The directors' obligation to act for the benefit 
of the entity and the shareholders collectively includes the obligation 
to insure the entity does what society expects. If a corporate entity 
has responsibilities in the community in which it operates because of 
its size and power, then it is not only appropriate, but necessary that 
directors consider these responsibilities in their decision-making. As 
part of a director's duty of care he needs to insure that the entity is 
able to meet its obligation of good citizenship. For example, it may 
be that all large economic entities should have not only an audit 
~committee (and, if a publicly traded corporation, a nominating com-
mittee) but also a public policy committee charged with identifying 
the specific social responsibilities of the corporation and monitoring 
their fulfillment. 
This fiduciary approach places an obligation to monitor corpo-
rate behavior on the directors. Directors as fiduciaries to the corpo-
ration must exercise appropriate due care under the circumstances to 
provide compliance with the law, and failure can lead to liability. 
These fiduciary obligations can be enforced not only by sharehold-
ers, but by the public through both criminal and civil actions. Direc-
tors, of course, are not insurers of corporate behavior. They should 
not be held vicariously liable for negligent or criminal acts of corpo-
rate agents, but they do have a duty of care that extends to all aspects 
of corporate, activity. Because directors are the representatives and 
stewards53 of the owners, the public has a right to look to the direc-
tors when a corporation fails to meet its obligations. 
The fiduciary underpinnings of corporate conflict of interest 
53. The Business Roundtable statement includes the following: "The directors are stew-
ards - stewards of the owner's interest in the enterprise, and stewards also of the owner's legal 
and ethical obligations to other groups affected by corporate activity." See 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 
2096 (1978). An English commentator expressed a similar concept: "Now our corporation 
laws put great emphasis on the fiduciary duties of directors .... (A director] owes only one 
duty, honesty to the interests of his company." Brown.An English Perspective, in COMMENTA-
RIES, supra note 2, at 148. 
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cases also help to resolve the corporate governance problems involv-
ing the composition and structure of the board of directors. First, 
the fiduciary concept encourages the use of outside directors. The 
desire for nonmanagement directors on the board and for a separate 
nominating committee composed of outside directors is at least in 
part a response to conflict of interest concerns. In any conflict-of-
interest case involving officers, the directors making the decision 
should be as independent as possible. The role of the board of direc-
tors in takeover bid situations54 and in determining whether or not to 
recommend dismissal of a derivative suit55 ~re contemporary exam-
ples where the role of outside directors is generally recognized as 
crucial. The existence of a nominating committee composed only of 
outside directors may become an important test of independent judg-
ment in actions by directors of publicly traded corporations. 
In this context the desirability of outside directors is deterin.ined 
by the size and complexities of the corporation. The greater the eco-
nomic impact of the corporate entity, the greater the need for outside 
directors. This need is both to reduce the conflict of interest that 
exists when all directors are employees and members of manage-
ment, and to provide a diversity of experience and background. 
Publicly traded corporations should have a substantial number of 
outside directors because of the large number of shareholders. 
Quasi-publicly traded corporations which have a significant number 
of employees, or affect the community in other significant ways 
should also have outside representation, as should the boards of ma-
jor nonprofit corporations. Composition of boards of directors 
should mirror the complexity and diversity of the corporation's ac-
tivities; no one pattern is appropriate. 
Finally, the emphasis on the corporate entity argues against the 
use of constituency directors. Directors elected or appointed to rep-
resent particular constituencies have a splintered allegiance, and can 
create inherent conflicts of interest.56 This is as true of; employee 
representatives on boards as it is of student or alumni representatives 
on nonprofit education boards. The goal should not be to "balance 
54. For a case with strong reliance on good faith and the business judgment rule, see 
Painter v. Marshall Field & Co., 386 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. ill. 1980). 
55. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), where the court said even an 
independent board cannot foreclose a derivative suit. 
56. Conflict of interest could also be alleged where a director promoted the interests of 
only a single group of shareholders. It is also theoretically possible that a director's allegiance 
to all stockholders could conflict with his duty to the corporate entity, but such a conflict seems 
unlikely. 
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conflict of interest," but to select individuals who recognize their al-
legiance to the enterprise itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the key problems subsumed under the rubric of corpo-
rate governance were identified nearly fifty years ago. This Essay 
has attempted to identify the contemporary corporate governance is-
sues of the quasi-publicly traded corporation and the role of the cor-
porate director, and to focus the analysis of these issues on the role 
of the securities markets and evolving fiduciary standards for direc-
tors. Yet the target is still moving, and much work remains to be 
done. 
